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Abstract:
In this article, I argue that, contrary to appearances, Existentialism makes room for a distinctive form of
virtue ethics. Working primarily from Simone de Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity, I argue that while
Existentialist ethics is centered around the will – whether it wills itself free, i.e., attains authenticity – it
also encourages us to describe states of character in normative terms insofar as they confirm or contest
this will. I outline an Existentialist virtue ethics over several sections. First, I provide an Existentialist
account of states of character. Second, I consider authenticity as a sort of meta-virtue. Third, I examine
the role of ambiguity in moral virtue, on this Existentialist account. Finally, I respond to a number of
reasons for thinking that Existentialism cannot provide a virtue ethics.
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It might seem that Existentialist ethics and virtue ethics have little to offer each other
philosophically. And there are a number of reasons why matters appear thus. For example, Irene
McMullin points out that contemporary virtue ethics often adopts a naturalism with which
Existentialism would find itself at odds. 1 Or, as Steven Crowell argues, it seems that someone who does
the right thing from a fixed and stable character might do so simply as part of a tendency to do what one
does – but by Existentialist lights, such a supposedly virtuous tendency would be inauthentic. 2
Yet, in The Ethics of Ambiguity, we find Beauvoir claiming, “One can choose not to will himself
free [on peut ne pas se vouloir libre]. In laziness [la paresse], heedlessness [l’étourderie], capriciousness,
cowardice, impatience, one contests the meaning of the project at the very moment that one defines
it.” 3 Here, Beauvoir names a set of character traits that obstruct willing one’s own freedom. In other
words, Beauvoir identifies a set of vices – and vices defined in specifically Existentialist terms. What I
would like to do in this paper is to attempt to follow this suggestion by outlining an Existentialist virtue
ethics. My purpose here is not so much to provide an exegesis of Beauvoir, as to take up this suggestion
of hers, to see whether it works and how much we can do with it. 4 Nor will I attempt to justify either
virtue or Existentialist ethics. Rather, my aim is simply to show that Existentialism can and should
endorse a certain conception of virtues as normative.
To my mind, there are two key reasons to pursue this project. The first is that it allows us to
explore Existentialism’s moral dimension in new terms. Just as Kant’s ethics is focused around the will,
but his complete ethics includes an account of virtue, so Existentialist ethics is focused around willing
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one’s freedom (and the freedom of others), but can be seen to include an account of virtue. Developing
this account provides a more complete understanding of Existentialism’s ethical possibilities. Second, I
think Existentialism can make interesting contributions to virtue ethics. Considerable work has been
done in the past two decades on contributions Phenomenology can make to virtue ethics, and some
work on Existentialism and virtue ethics, notably Irene McMullin’s excellent Existential Flourishing. In
this article, I offer a new account of the contributions Existentialism can make to our conception of
virtue, starting from Beauvoir’s description of what it takes to “will onseself free.” 5 I will argue that
Existentialism can provide us with more phenomenologically precise descriptions of virtue and vice than
are otherwise available, and can ground virtue ethics in something more fundamental than contingent
features of human psychology.
My plan will be to outline what an Existentialist virtue ethics might look like over five sections. First,
I will provide a general sketch of the view. Second, I will explain what states of character amount to on
such a view. Third, I discuss the role of authenticity in this account. Fourth, I explain why the
Existentialist notion of ambiguity should be seen as fundamental to the moral virtues. Finally, I consider
some major obstacles to offering an Existentialist virtue ethics.
1. An Existentialist Virtue Ethics
First, what defines a virtue ethics? Obviously, there is not a single account of virtue ethics, and so some
reserve is required here. But we can provisionally say the following: A virtue ethics accounts for ethical
normativity (at least in part) in terms of virtues. Virtues are good states of character, by which one
usually understands something like stable dispositions to think, feel, act, etc. in certain ways. For
example, as a first pass, Annas defines virtue as a particular kind of “state or disposition of a person”. 6
Or, Swanton defines virtue as “a good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to respond to,
or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good way.” 7 Further, while there are
different ways to understand what a disposition is, it’s usual to say something along the lines of: one has
a disposition to, e.g., act in a certain way if, when appropriately prompted under normal circumstances,
one tends to act in that way. In brief, if Existentialism can allow for a virtue ethics, it must be able to
account for ethical normativity in terms of states of character, where states of character are something
like dispositions to think, feel, act, etc. in certain ways.
Second, what defines an Existentialist ethics? Unfortunately, given the diffuse character of the
Existentialist movement, this question presents even greater difficulties. For the sake of simplicity, I’ll
adopt Webber’s claim that what distinguishes an Existentialist ethics is the “view that all that is
intrinsically valuable is the nature or structure of our existence.” 8 On such a view, values do not exist
independently of consciousness; instead, consciousness is itself the primary bearer of value, for which
things and actions have value. That is, things and actions are not good or bad in themselves; they appear
good or bad with respect to projects and goals that we have freely chosen. 9 To give a simple example: a
new job offer that would pay well but require me to work long hours will appear good if I adopt the goal
of procuring a large sum of money, bad if I adopt the goal of devoting time to friends and family. In this
sense, Sartre claims, “freedom [is] the foundation of all values.” 10 The Existentialist concludes that moral
value cannot be defined in terms of universal rules of action (as the deontologist claims), nor in terms of
the consequences of those actions (as the consequentialist would have it), since the moral value of an
action and its consequences cannot be determined except with respect to the freely chosen projects of
particular subjects. According to Webber, what matters then for the Existentialist, ethically speaking, is
just that we “possess and express the single overarching virtue of authenticity: the disposition to
recognize and promote what is most genuinely our own, the fundamental nature of our existence,”
namely, freedom. 11 Or, as Sartre puts it, while we cannot pronounce moral judgments on others’ choices
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of projects per se, we can in principle render moral judgment on the basis of whether they succeed or
fail to “will freedom for freedom’s sake.” 12
Beauvoir’s view in Ethics of Ambiguity exemplifies these features of an Existentialist ethics, since
it holds that freedom is the source of value and grounds morality on this fact. She writes that “freedom
is the source from which all significations and all values spring.” 13 In turn, our relation to this freedom,
as the source of value, determines the moral quality of our actions: “To will oneself moral and to will
oneself free are one and the same decision.” 14
According to Beauvoir, however, this claim poses a problem. The Existentialist claims both that
we are free just in virtue of the kinds of things we are (i.e., consciousness), and that we ought to will
ourselves free. But how can there be a moral demand to will ourselves to be something we already are?
To formulate the problem in other words, it seems like freedom is not identical with value, since we are
already free by our nature, but surely we are not always or already moral. Beauvoir’s solution to this
problem is to distinguish between two kinds of freedom, what she calls “natural freedom” and “moral”
or “ethical freedom.” 15
According to Beauvoir, there is an important difference between the sort of freedom we have
originally, just in virtue of the human condition – the freedom of “spontaneously casting ourselves into
the world” or of being a “lack” – and the sort of freedom we have when we “will ourselves free,” i.e.,
when we actively take up and realize our freedom through making committed choices. 16 The former sort
of freedom – natural freedom – is simply a fact of our nature, not chosen or earned, and is essentially
negative: it is the freedom of not having any pre-established ends or values. In contrast, the second sort
of freedom – moral freedom – is an achievement, optional (in the sense that it may never be achieved),
and positive: to attain moral freedom, I must positively value freedom. We can be, and in fact often are,
free in the first sense without being free in the second, which explains why we are not, on this account,
moral by nature. As Beauvoir puts it, “to will oneself free is to effect the transition from nature to
morality by establishing a genuine freedom on the original upsurge of existence.” 17
But what exactly does it take to be morally free? Beauvoir describes various stages of this
transition (in her Chapter 2, “Personal Freedom and Others”), but we can focus on two requirements.
First, to be morally free requires that, in willing whatever projects one does, one recognizes the value of
freedom (as, in Sartre’s phrase, the “foundation of all values”). One could not be morally free while, for
example, willing a project that undermined one’s own freedom or the freedom of others. Further, one is
not morally free in virtue of willing a project on the grounds that, e.g., it was required by one’s biology
or social expectation: such a project does not value freedom (but rather biology or society) in pursuing
its end. Second, we shouldn’t imagine moral freedom as some kind of self-contained revelry in the fact
of one’s own freedom. This would be a bit like a virtuosa valuing her talent with the violin by only ever
contemplating the violin, or celebrating some prized coffee beans by putting them on a shelf, never to
be ground. We value freedom precisely by taking up and using it to commit to some valued end. We are
morally free, then, when we commit to some valued end in the recognition of freedom as the source of
value. This is what it means to “will oneself free.” 18 For Beauvoir, the fundamental moral quality is that
of a will that wills itself free in this sense.
So, given these definitions, does Existentialism leave room for a virtue ethics?
We can start by following Beauvoir’s suggestion in the above passage. There, she provides a list
of vices, e.g., laziness, cowardice, impatience. We can think of these as vices, because they are states of
character, and in particular, dispositions to think, feel, act in certain ways; e.g., laziness is a disposition
to fail to follow through on chosen projects. Further, these are normative states of character, and are
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distinguished from virtues in terms of the valence of normativity attributable to them (i.e., they are, so
to speak, bad states of character).
One could reasonably suspect that I am putting too much weight on this short passage by
Beauvoir. In particular, one might wonder whether these character traits really have moral import for
Beauvoir, or if they are just a convenient way of making a point about the nature of freedom and
existence. But Beauvoir does in fact want to make a moral point about these traits: she invokes them
precisely as characteristic of the failure to transition from natural to moral freedom, as exemplary of
how “one can choose not to will himself free.” 19 In laziness, for example, one “contests the meaning of
the project at the very moment that one defines it,” insofar as one uses one’s freedom to set a project,
but fails to take responsibility for realizing that project. The project does not, then, have the meaning it
would have if I approached it diligently. In other words, laziness is a way of failing to be morally free, in
the sense that in laziness, we do not actively take responsibility for our freedom.
So, at the very least, such vices are not moral for Beauvoir. But couldn’t they, for all that, simply
be natural, i.e., amoral, and so not properly vices (i.e., immoral) at all in her eyes? The problem with this
suggestion is that one could say the same thing about character types that Beauvoir clearly does
consider immoral, e.g., the adventurer (e.g., Cortez) or the tyrant – since they too fail to recognize and
take responsibility for freedom, in the sense of not recognizing the intersubjectivity inherent in freedom
and so affirming the freedom of others. 20 Beauvoir does not, then, consider someone who fails to
transition from the natural to the moral to be simply amoral. Failures to effect this transition are ways of
being immoral. The amoral case, for Beauvoir, is not that of merely naturally free person, but that of the
child (who is not yet properly free) or the oppressed (who has had their freedom forcibly removed). On
this account, then, the immoral amounts to a failure fully to take responsibility for one’s freedom – it is
a failure to attain moral freedom. And, in this sense, laziness, impatience, etc. are immoral.
So, it is appropriate to read laziness, cowardice, etc. as vices, for Beauvoir, since they evidently
are states of character, and they have normative import. Conversely, states of character can have a
positive normative value for her. Thus, she writes, “The value of the chosen end is confirmed and,
reciprocally, the genuineness of the choice is manifested concretely through patience, courage, and
fidelity.” 21 In other words, with traits such as courage and fidelity, we successfully make the transition
from natural to moral freedom, and so such traits have moral value. Indeed, such virtues manifest moral
freedom, since they are ways of willing genuinely.
On this account of virtue, normativity comes not from something like excellence at the human
function, a tendency to achieve happiness, or consistency with natural law, etc. Rather, the normativity
gets into states of character simply in virtue of whether they achieve moral freedom. The highest level
normative demand, on Beauvoir’s account, is that we take responsibility for our freedom through
defining and realizing projects in a suitable manner (i.e., not in a manner that devalues freedom in our
own case or the cases of others), whatever these may be. For her, as we have seen, our states of
character can either confirm or contest these projects, and so can be moral or immoral in this secondary
sense.
2. States of Character
So, we have a sketch of an Existentialist account of normative states of character. At this point, I would
like to introduce an important refinement into the account. As we have seen, the prevailing discourse
about states of character is that they are stable dispositions, to think, feel, act, etc. in certain ways. I
doubt that this is a responsible way to talk about virtues on the Existentialist account, at least under
certain definitions of “disposition.” Part of the problem here is that virtue ethics sometimes adopts the
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language of dispositions without analyzing it in depth. And while the literature on dispositions certainly
presents us with more than one way to talk about dispositions, nevertheless at least some of these
definitions would seem to disqualify dispositions from playing a role in an Existentialist virtue ethics.
Take Ryle’s definition: “To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to
undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in particular state, or to undergo a
particular change, when a particular condition is realized.” 22 But the language of being bound or liable to
be in certain states under certain conditions is entirely absent from Beauvoir’s discussion of patience,
impatience, etc. For her, they appear to be more like qualities of the will, i.e., manners of willing. It’s far
from clear that this kind of “being bound or liable” is even compatible with Existentialist accounts of
freedom. Objects can be bound or liable to be in certain states under certain conditions, but can
subjects?
Fortunately, I don’t think that anything about virtue ethics requires this kind of definition of
virtue. Hursthouse, for example, argues that we think of “character traits as involving much more than
tendencies or dispositions to act, even for reasons.” 23 Nor does Aristotle define states of character in
terms of being bound to act in certain ways. In Nicomachean Ethics, he simply defines a state as “what
we have when we are well or badly off in relation to feelings.” 24 Further, consider how he distinguishes
between virtuous action and virtuous character. He does so not just in terms of a distinction between a
chance action and a general disposition for acting, but in terms of a) knowledge, b) decision, c) a firm
and unchanging state. 25 Aristotle already defines virtuous character, then, in terms of something like
intentionality (knowledge and decision), and not simply in terms of boundedness or liability.
Quite aside from the language of dispositions, there is, I think, a very natural way for an
Existentialist to think about states of character, supplied by Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “styles of
existence.” 26 He writes that “I have a certain style of life.” 27 Further, “along with existence, I received a
way of existing, or a style. All of my actions and thoughts are related to this structure … .” 28 In brief, we
can think of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a “style of existence” as a generalized manner of disclosing
meaning in the world, or we might say, an orientation toward the world. 29 Merleau-Ponty’s basic
contention is that the way I perceive the world around me, what it means and what value it has,
corresponds to my particular “hold upon the world” or way of “being in the world.” 30 For example, in
agreeing with Sartre that feelings like pain or fatigue don’t force me to act in certain ways, MerleauPonty points out that this is because such feelings are experienced, or have their sense, through one’s
“attitude towards the world.” 31 He writes, “Fatigue does not stop my companion because he likes the
feel of his body damp with sweat, the scorching heat of the road and the sun and, in short, because he
likes to feel himself at the center of things, to draw together their rays, or to turn himself into the gaze
for this light and the sense of touch for these surfaces. My fatigue stops me because I do not enjoy this,
because I have differently chosen my way of being in the world, and because, for example, I do not look
to be out in nature, but rather to gain the recognition of others.” 32 The way we experience these
feelings, then, depends on our “way of being in the world.” 33 Or, we might think of stinginess, for
example, not merely as a propensity not to share my resources, but as a style of existence in which I
experience the needs of others as an unwanted burden, harrying my own resources – which, let us
suppose, are ample, but I experience as already stretched too thin – from all directions. In contrast, we
might think of generosity as an orientation on which I experience the needs of others as a call to action.
The general point is that the way the world reveals itself, and the way it motivates us, is correlative to a
particular style of existence. If we thought of states of character in these terms, then they would not
count as liabilities to act in certain ways, but as particular ways of disclosing meaning in the world, just
as the adventurer’s style of existence discloses the meaning of fatigue in a different way than does the
writer’s.
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This, I take it, is pretty much how Sartre speaks of character: not as a quality of being, but as a
way of projecting oneself in the world. He writes of Clovis’ ambition that “to be ambitious is to project
conquering a throne or honors; it is not a given which would incite one to conquest.” 34 Or, in Notebooks
for an Ethics, he claims that it is not technically correct to say “I am a coward,” for example, since “this
quality would imply some thesis about being.” 35 Rather, we should say “I project being” in a manner that
is decidedly not courageous. 36 Here too, Sartre seems to have in mind something like character not as a
given quality or liability, but as a manner of disclosing meaning. 37
Note that such styles of existence are relatively stable, albeit plastic. As with Aristotle’s states of
character, for Merleau-Ponty, such styles of existence are habitual. He continues, “we must recognize a
sort of sedimentation of our life: when an attitude toward the world has been confirmed often enough,
it becomes privileged for us,” i.e., it becomes a “habitual being in the world.” 38 At the same time, such
habitual modes of being in the world can be learned, altered, or developed – in short, they are
cultivatable, in the same way the virtues have traditionally been thought to be.
I don’t see why an Existentialist couldn’t, then, understand states of character as styles of existence
or modes of being in the world, i.e., as something like general orientations toward or ways of disclosing
the world. This would have the advantage of capturing the way Beauvoir talks about laziness, caprice,
etc., not as tendencies for action, but as ways of defining the meaning of our projects: laziness, as a
state of character, discloses our projects (determines their meaning) as lacking value at the very
moment we define them; cowardice discloses the world as overwhelming our projects; etc.
3. Authenticity
It is not entirely unfamiliar to think of authenticity as a virtue. 39 In this section, I would like to consider
authenticity as a sort of meta-virtue, i.e., as a virtue governing each of the other virtues.
Obviously, there are different ways of defining authenticity. In arguing that authenticity is a
meta-virtue, I don’t mean to be bound to any particular definition of authenticity (nor do I suppose that
definitions of authenticity offered by various Existentialists’ are necessarily compatible), so much as to
the phenomenon these definitions are meant to capture. But Webber gives us a helpful starting point
when he interprets the Existentialist idea of authenticity as “the disposition to recognize and promote
what is most genuinely our own, the fundamental nature of existence.” 40 Given the framing of this
paper, then, we can understand authenticity in terms of Beauvoir’s distinction between natural and
moral freedom, where moral freedom, as “willing oneself free,” is “recognizing and promoting what is
most genuinely our own.” For example, Beauvoir claims that to affect the transition from nature to
morality is to found “a genuine freedom [liberté authentique] on the original upsurge of existence.” 41 In
the terms I have been developing here, authenticity would name the state of character that corresponds
to taking up and realizing one’s freedom actively, i.e., to achieving moral freedom; inauthenticity to the
failure to achieve moral freedom. 42 Assuming this is an acceptable definition of authenticity, and that
we can understand virtue in the manner outlined above – namely, as a state of character that achieves
moral freedom – then, on this account authenticity is in fact identical with virtue, and inauthenticity
with vice.
Here again one might have qualms about whether the definition of authenticity as a virtue is at
all appropriate. One might object that nothing in Heidegger’s account, for example, suggests we take
authenticity to be a “state of character.” Instead, Heidegger defines authenticity and inauthenticity as
“existential modes of Being-in-the-world,” where inauthenticity names a mode of Being-in-the-world
that is “fascinated by the world,” and authenticity names a mode of Being-in-the-world defined by
Dasein’s own self. 43 Certainly, in this light, the language of virtues as “dispositions” appears importantly
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inadequate. Authenticity is not a liability to think, feel, and act in certain ways, so much as a mode of
Being-in-the-world, i.e., something like a general orientation toward, or way of disclosing, oneself and
the world; inauthenticity is not so much a liability to think, feel, and act in certain other ways, as a
manner of disclosing oneself, namely, disclosing oneself in terms of the world. But once we adopt the
refined definition of state of character provided above, as a style of existence or way of being in the
world, authenticity evidently can count as a state of character (though Heidegger himself would, no
doubt, resist this terminology), since Heidegger defines authenticity precisely as a mode of Being-in-theworld. 44
I said above that authenticity is identical with virtue. More precisely, we might say that
authenticity is a sort of meta-virtue, insofar as each virtue is a manifestation or a form of authenticity. 45
If authenticity is the state of character that corresponds to taking up and realizing one’s freedom
actively, and the virtues are just the states of character that correspond to taking up and realizing one’s
freedom, then the virtues are just so many different forms of authenticity. For example, patience,
courage, and fidelity appear to be authentic states, whereas laziness, impatience, capriciousness, etc.
are inauthentic ones. Thus, in contrast to the manner in which caprice, heedlessness, etc., contest the
value of our choices, Beauvoir writes, “the value of the chosen end is confirmed and, reciprocally, the
genuineness [l’authenticité] of the choice is manifested concretely through patience, courage, and
fidelity.” 46
One might object that we can be virtuous without necessarily being authentic, and so virtues
cannot be forms of authenticity. But this idea rings hollow. For example, one could not, I think, have
courage, in any meaningful sense, if one were not (at least, in this respect) authentic. For what would
“courage” be that is not a form of taking up and realizing one’s freedom in projects one values?
Intuitively, in my view, it amounts only to rashness or “adventurism.” Indeed, I would suggest that
something like this point is ultimately at stake in the strict conditions Aristotle puts on the situations in
which bravery can be exercised, e.g., when facing death in war (Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, Chapter
6).
To be virtuous in any meaningful sense, then, is to be (to the degree that one is virtuous)
authentic, and in this sense, authenticity is a meta-virtue. As a meta-virtue, authenticity shows up in
each of the various domains of human experience (i.e., the various spheres of activity and concern with
which most every human life engages). How it shows up in each domain is what defines the virtue for
that domain. 47 So, for example, we might take authenticity with respect to mortality to be courage;
authenticity with respect to intersubjectivity to be friendship or justice; authenticity with respect to
one’s property to be generosity, etc. Of course, defining how authenticity shows up in each domain will
be challenging – but the key point is that to determine the virtue proper to a domain, one has to figure
out what moral freedom looks like in that domain. And my contention is that moral freedom does take a
specific form in each domain.
This is not to say that authenticity requires the choice of some specific project or other, just that
the way we hold these projects is defined by authenticity. In other words, my claim that moral freedom
must take a specific form in each domain must not be confused with a claim that Existentialists advocate
a specific set of virtuous actions. Of course, quite to the contrary, Existentialists hold that any such set of
rules for action would prove inviable in the face of freedom and would be entirely compatible with
inauthenticity (since any set of rules can be followed in an inauthentic manner). But my claim is not that
authenticity requires that the will take on some particular contents, only that it take on some particular
forms, since one cannot genuinely will oneself free without adopting the relevant forms (namely, the
virtues). 48 Beauvoir argues, for example, that I cannot genuinely will myself free in a way that is
capricious.
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Further, I hope it is clear that I am not assimilating Existentialism to any particular cultural
conception of virtue, e.g., to a bourgeois table of virtues. Rather, virtue is simply defined in terms of the
requirements of authenticity, which may or may not agree with a particular culture’s assessment of
virtue. In fact, by these lights, dissent or revolt from prevailing norms that limit authenticity would I
think count as a virtue. 49
4. Ambiguity and Moral Virtue
I have said that moral freedom takes a certain form (though not a certain content) in each domain of
experience. How exactly do we pick out what this form is? Evidently, we cannot identify virtue, on this
account, simply in terms of an intermediate between extremes. But we can be more specific about how
to identify virtues, and can do so in a way that captures something of the Aristotelian idea of virtue as an
intermediate. The task for us is to identify what it would take to own up to the kind of freedom we have,
and this, essentially, means successfully negotiating the ambiguity of the human condition. Let me
explain what I mean.
Existentialism defines the human condition in terms of a fundamental ambiguity between the
for-itself and the in-itself, self-consciousness and being. 50 Moral freedom consists in taking up and
negotiating this ambiguity. In contrast, we could, following Merleau-Ponty, call “ambivalence” the
attitude that rejects one side or the other of an ambiguity. 51 Ambivalence, since it rejects the ambiguous
situation of human freedom, fails to own up to the kind of freedom we actually have. In this sense,
ambivalence amounts to a failure to attain moral freedom. Given my definition of authenticity in terms
of moral freedom, we could at this point further define authenticity as the disposition to negotiate the
ambiguity of the human condition successfully. In contrast, inauthenticity amounts to ambivalence: the
refusal of one or the other pole of ambiguity.
I will try to illustrate this approach by sketching (no doubt imperfectly) several examples.
First, consider generosity. Generosity avoids two vices: stinginess and prodigality. But what are
stinginess and prodigality, when considered not as liabilities to act in certain ways, but as ways of
disclosing meaning? I would suggest that both these attitudes amount to forms of ambivalence: the
rejection of one side or the other of an ambiguous situation. The ambiguous situation at stake in
generosity might be something like the relation between a subject and its material expression in
property (more specifically, material expression as it stands in relation to others). The ambiguity here
consists in the fact that a) we are subjects, and so not defined by material things, and b) we are also
embodied agents in a spatio-temporal world, and so not indifferent to our expression through material
things. 52 The prodigal person realizes a) at the price of rejecting b); the stingy person recognizes b) at
the price of rejecting a). In contrast, generosity consists in a disposition to negotiate these conflicting
demands: expressing one’s agency in relation to others through one’s material means.
Or take the example of courage. One way to think about courage is to take it as the virtue with
respect to mortality. 53 The ambiguity to which it responds, then, is something like the ambiguity of being
a finite reason: a subject related to its own death. And here too, there are two ways in which one can
refuse this ambiguity in ambivalence: a) one could reject the importance of one’s life, and so of one’s
death, in asserting one’s subjectivity, or b) one could refuse one’s subjectivity for the sake of one’s life.
These are something like what Aristotle called rashness and cowardice, or perhaps are something like
what we find expressed in Hegel’s description of the Master-Servant dialectic. 54
Or, friendship, philia, is the disposition to negotiate the ambiguity of intersubjectivity, of being a
for-others for-oneself. This situation is ambiguous, because in it we oscillate between being a subject for
which there are others, and an object for other subjects. We can reject this ambiguity by a) taking
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ourselves as objects for other subjects – something like what Aristotle called obsequiousness – or b)
taking others as objects for our subjectivity – something like what Aristotle called cantankerousness. In
contrast, friendship, or love, is the disposition to successfully negotiate this ambiguity.
To some extent, this is the way Merleau-Ponty has drawn the distinction between love and
jealousy. Merleau-Ponty argues that both love and jealousy draw on a primitive experience of
indisitinction between self and other, i.e., on the fundamental ambiguity of the distinction between self
and other, but in different ways. So, he writes,
A) “One might say that the jealous person sees his existence invaded by the success of the other
and feels himself dispossessed by him, and that in this sense jealousy is essentially a confusion
between the self and the other. It is the attitude of the one who sees no life for himself other
than that of achieving what the other has achieved, who does not define himself by himself but
in relation to what others have.” 55
B) “To love is inevitably to enter into an undivided situation with another. … The perspectives
remain separate – and yet they overlap. One can no longer say ‘this is mine, this is yours;’ the
roles cannot be absolutely separated.” 56
And yet jealousy and love take up this ambiguity in different ways. Merleau-Ponty writes that
jealousy is “ensnaring”: “The ensnaring love of the child is the love that never has enough proofs, and
ends by imprisoning and trapping the other in its immediacy.” 57 In contrast, normal or non-pathological
love consists in “having confidence above and beyond what can be proved,” and thereby allows the
other to be a separate (though not absolutely separate) perspective. 58 Thus, love succeeds in
negotiating the ambiguity of self and other in a way that jealousy – since it cannot tolerate dispossession
from the other – does not.
In each of these cases, there is not a fixed set of rules that count as criteria for successful
negotiation of ambiguity; formally, we can only say that that failure consists in taking a one-sided, or
ambivalent, approach to ambiguity. Indeed, it may be that ambiguity, per force, rules out any hard and
fast resolutions to moral problems, and when approached in terms of hard and fast laws, ossifies into
antinomy. Beauvoir writes that “it is impossible to determine this relationship between meaning and
content abstractly and universally: there must be a trial and decision in each case.” 59 The latter half of
Ethics of Ambiguity is largely concerned to show that if we side universally with one side or another of
an ambiguity we will be led into morally outrageous positions. If this is true, then the notion of virtue is
particularly well suited to describe the right kind of stance towards ambiguity: resolving ethical
situations in light of ambiguity will be a matter of prudence – practical deliberation or phronesis – that
requires careful attunement to the case. As Beauvoir writes, “Contrary to the formal strictness of
Kantianism for whom the more abstract the act is the more virtuous it is, generosity seems to us to be
better grounded and therefore more valid the less distinction there is between the other and ourself
and the more we fulfill ourself in taking the other as an end.” 60 Beauvoir means that I am not more
generous the more I act out of a formal duty to an abstract law, but rather to the extent that I
experience this particular other’s good as bound to my own. Conversely, I do not fail in generosity by
failing to meet an abstract law, but by indifference or else by jealousy (by recognizing the “indistinction”
between self and other, without tolerating any separation). That is, generosity requires us to negotiate a
particular ambiguous situation, the ambiguity between my particular self and this particular other. 61
Perhaps we could say there is a formal demand to negotiate this ambiguity, and we can note features of
what it means to do so: for example, to negotiate the ambiguity of self and other requires
acknowledging indistinction while allowing for separation. But there is no hard and fast rule for how to
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instantiate these features, or how to negotiate ambiguity generally: this must be discerned within each
situation.
So, virtue would name a disposition to negotiate an ambiguous situation well, whereas vice
would name a disposition to negotiate such a situation poorly, namely by taking a one-sided or extreme
approach to a situation. If this last formulation is accurate, then I do not think this account of virtue so
much rejects Aristotle’s notion of virtue as an intermediate, as grounds it in the ambiguity of the human
condition. 62 Virtue is a disposition to negotiate this ambiguity, whereas vices, the extremes, consist in its
refusal. While Aristotle does not make this claim, certainly, I do think it finds expression in his argument
that the gods lack the moral virtues. 63 In my view, this claim gets to the same phenomenon I am
expressing in claiming that virtue consists in negotiating the ambiguity of the human condition – if we
were gods, there would be no such ambiguity, and so no need for the virtues of the human condition. In
this sense, virtue and vice are dispositional responses to the ambiguity of the human condition.
5. Objections and Responses
We now have a general formulation of an Existentialist virtue ethics: virtues are authentic modes of
being in the world that successfully negotiate the ambiguity of the human condition, i.e., modes that
realize moral freedom. At this point, I would like to consider several challenges to this Existentialist
virtue ethics.
First, one might be concerned that virtue ethics has traditionally thought of the virtues as rooted
in human nature. For Aristotle, for example, virtues are defined relative to the human function: virtue is
just the disposition to perform the human function well in the various domains of human action. 64 In
contrast, a core principle of at least certain kinds of Existentialism is that human nature has no
normative import. By the lights of this kind of Existentialism, defining value in terms of human nature
would amount to bad faith, i.e., an abdication of freedom under the pretense of being determined by
one’s nature. 65 As Sartre famously claims in “Existentialism is a Humanism,” “There is no human
nature.” 66 According to this line of thinking, in light of freedom, human nature appears normatively
inert. A related point, I take it, is at stake in Heidegger’s distinction between anthropology, the study of
the human being, and the analytic of Dasein, i.e., the study of the essential structures of existence. 67
But nothing about Beauvoir’s invocation of virtues and vices ties it to peculiarities of human
nature. 68 Instead, she understands these vices and virtues strictly in terms of the difference between
natural and moral freedom, i.e., in terms of “willing oneself free.” And that distinction is not a
contingent feature of human nature, but an essential structure of experience (i.e., the experience of any
finite free being could be characterized in these same terms). If that’s right, and if virtue can be defined
in terms of moral freedom, then we can think of virtue and vice as existential modes, in Heidegger’s
sense (i.e., as pertaining to ontological structures of existence), just as Heidegger defines authenticity
and inauthenticity as “existential modes of being-in-the-world.” 69 We do not, for example, need to
define capriciousness as a contingent feature of peculiarly human psychology: instead, we can define it
in terms of the temporal character of moral freedom, i.e., as a disengagement of freedom from the time
in which it would realize its projects. 70 In other words, if we define virtue and vice as existential modes,
then there is no question of defining value in terms of contingent features of human nature. There is no
question here of a natural law ethics, e.g., an obligation to continue in existence in virtue of a natural
disposition to do so. This kind of ethics really would (by Existentialist lights) be rooted in peculiarities of
human nature, and so amount to bad faith. 71
Second, as Jack Reynolds has pointed out, one might have a more general worry about whether
character traits can be a relevant consideration for Existentialism. 72 In virtue of the Existentialist
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conception of freedom, appeals to character might seem like another form of bad faith. Sartre, for
example, writes that “there is no such thing as a cowardly temperament.” 73 Sartre does think some
persons are cowards, but writes that, “a coward is defined by the deed he has done” – such that
cowardice seems not so much a state as a collection of acts. 74 Once we get the idea of freedom into
view, it’s not clear that the idea of a character even makes sense. For what does it tell us that, e.g., I
have a cowardly state of character? Either, it says that I am compelled to undertake cowardly actions, in
which case I am not free; or, I am free, in which case a cowardly character is irrelevant to my action. 75
But I’m unconvinced that this is a good Existentialist account of freedom. Merleau-Ponty
criticizes such a view, basically on the ground that it fails to recognize that our freedom gears into a
situation and general style of existence – the motives disclosed by our style of existence “do not annul
freedom,” but show that it “is not without supports within being.” 76 Of course, one may not wish to
admit the Merleau-Ponty of the Phenomenology as Existentialist. In this case, I’d just point out that not
even Sartre or Beauvoir seem to propose any such incompatibility between character and freedom.
What Sartre demands is that character does not violate our freedom – it does not force us to act in
certain ways. For example, we saw him claim of ambition that it is “not a given which would incite one
to conquest,” but it is “to project conquering a throne or honors.” 77 Or, he claims that the character of
the one disposed to give into fatigue is “not a factual given and is only a name given to the way in which
I suffer my fatigue.” 78 This evidently does not rule out the significance of character for freedom – it just
denies that a character like cowardice is a natural fact and defines it instead as a way of experiencing
the world. This point is in perfect agreement with everything I have said about character. Just like
Merleau-Ponty, Sartre writes that I can resist my fatigue “only by means of a radical transformation of
my being-in-the-world.” 79 Beauvoir evidently thinks of character in similar terms, writing that our ways
of casting ourselves into the world “determine no behavior,” and yet that one “draws the motivations of
his moral attitude from within the character which he has given himself and from within the universe
which is its correlative. 80
Third, consider Crowell’s point, mentioned in my Introduction, that Existentialism and virtue
ethics seem to conflict, if one thinks of virtue as a stable disposition to do the right thing. But, Crowell,
points out, one can do the right thing from a stable disposition simply because it is, so to speak, what
one does, such that one can seemingly be virtuous without being authentic. But we should not think of
virtue in these terms. 81 Take Aristotle’s distinction between producing grammatical results and being a
grammarian. 82 One can, he says, produce grammatical results by following instructions, but one can only
be a grammarian by acting with grammatical knowledge: knowledge not of what one does (of how one
has been instructed) but of the rules of grammar. Aristotle does go on to say that knowledge counts for
less in the case of virtue than of crafts. Nevertheless, he seems to hold that to act virtuously one must
know not merely what one does – i.e., what are the social expectations in a particular circumstance –
but something like the rules of virtue (i.e., what virtue is and how to realize it). I do not think, for
example, that we would call someone courageous if they risk their life simply because they are expected
to. Such a person acts from something more like a fear of disapproval, of standing out, of taking
responsibility for their freedom, etc., than from a positive recognition of the value of the project for
which they are prepared to sacrifice. One could consistently ape virtue absent authenticity – that is, one
could have a stable liability to act virtuously (to do what the virtuous person would do) under normal
circumstances. But one could not, I think, be virtuous (have a virtuous style of existence) absent
authenticity.
Fourth, there is a certain tension introduced into my account by the fact that virtue is supposed
to be normative in a secondary sense. What is normative in the primary sense, on this account, is the
will, namely, willing oneself free. On Beauvoir’s account, virtues are normative insofar as they
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participate in realizing this will. But these primary and secondary senses of normativity seem to conflict
in certain ways. For example, one might think that one can will oneself free at any moment, but one
cannot simply become virtuous at any moment: the former seems to be a decision one can make
instantaneously, whereas the latter is a habit one cultivates over time. The problem with this objection
is that, on the account of freedom I have been attributing to Existentialism, one cannot so neatly
distinguish between will and character. In fact, we have seen Beauvoir suggest that one cannot
genuinely will oneself free without virtues like patience. The idea is that willing oneself free is not a
momentary decision, but a decision engaged in a temporal field, an ongoing effort of realizing itself. Of
course, one can in a certain sense decide today to, e.g., become a novelist, even if tomorrow one will
decide instead to take up fencing. But the question is whether this decision is really willed if it is not
accompanied by the kind of character that supports this will in realizing itself through time. What must
be said is that my character does not obviate free will – as Merleau-Ponty and Sartre point out, I am not
determined by my character, e.g., capriciousness does not make it impossible for me to genuinely
commit to writing a novel. But they also point out that I can act contrary to my character only at the
price of transforming my character, in Sartre’s terms, only by a “radical transformation of my being-inthe-world.” Or as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “I am free in relation to my fatigue precisely to the extent that I
am free in relation to my being in the world; [despite my fatigue] I am free to continue along my way on
condition of transforming my being in the world.” 83 For example, I only genuinely commit to writing my
novel if I succeed in giving up my capriciousness. No doubt, such momentary transformations are never
total, and there is no instantaneous transition from inauthenticity to authenticity. But my point is only
that will is inseparable from character, and so willing is bound to a temporal extension: willing myself
free is itself a project engaged in time, and not a momentary decision. As Beauvoir puts it, “the will is
developed in the course of time,” and this is why one needs character traits like patience to will in the
full sense. 84 Thus, while the will is moral in a primary sense, and character moral in a derivative sense,
nevertheless the former is inseparable from the latter. If this is a good phenomenology of the will, then
Existentialist ethics (so focused around the will) actually requires something like a description of virtue.
6. Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that far from being incompatible with virtue ethics, Existentialism can allow
for a distinctive virtue ethics of its own. No doubt, describing such an Existentialist virtue ethics puts
both Existentialism and virtue ethics in something of a new light. But I have tried to show that there is
no principled reason why Existentialism cannot include a virtue ethics. Moreover, I think this new light
actually illuminates something helpful about both. On the one hand, this Existentialist virtue ethics
opens up largely unexplored ethical possibilities for Existentialism. On the other hand, it provides a
phenomenologically acute articulation of many features of conventional virtue ethics, while allowing us
to ground virtue ethics on something more fundamental than arbitrary features of human psychology,
namely, on essential structures of experience.
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like McMullin’s normative demands of self, other, and shared world.
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existence, this meaning or value not being guaranteed from the outside by a pre-existing
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he fails to do is to assume honestly the consequences of such a wish. Only the freedom of
others keeps each one of us from hardening into the absurdity of facticity.” Ibid., p. 77. Cf.
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474.
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Webber, Rethinking Existentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 152. Note that,
just as I am not suggesting that Existentialism exhorts us to adopt a project of being virtuous,
neither do I mean that it exhorts us to be authentic. As Sartre puts it, “If you seek authenticity
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freedom of others.” Jean-Paul Sartre, Basic Writings (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 43. Note
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cit., pp. 13, 63.
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property of the will – namely, its willing itself free – whereas authenticity is a state of character.
My argument throughout is that moral freedom and authenticity (virtue) go together, or are
conditions for each other. They require each other without being identical, much as enclosing
three angles and having three sides go together as properties of a triangle, with the difference
that here, moral freedom is supposed to be primary in the order of value.
43. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper Perennial, 1962), pp. 220-221.
44. Admittedly, Heidegger uses these terms in an ontological, and not moral, sense. As he says
of fallenness, authenticity, and inauthenticity, “In relation to these phenomena, … our own
Interpretation is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique
of any everyday Dasein … .” Ibid., pp. 210-211. He says of inauthenticity that he does not
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